Introduction
The United States of America (USA) is the third largest country in the world with a population over 325 million (2016). The United States lies in the North America with a land border with Canada to the north and Mexico to the south. America adopted federalism in 1789 as the first modern federation in the world. American federalism, since its adoption in 1789, has evolved and experimented several theories and principles. Alike the United States, Canada also lies in the North America and have a border with the United States in the south and the Arctic Circle in the north. With a population of 36 million (2016), Canada, by size, is the second largest country in the world, after Russia. New France, established in 1534 was the first colony of France in North America which was later handed over to the British empire in 1763, as a result of defeat in Seven Years’ War. Colonies and territories like Upper Canada, Lower Canada and the Atlantic Colonies later formed the Canadian Confederation in 1867.
Both countries have experienced numerous waves of social, political, cultural, economic and security ups and downs. While the United States emerged as a centralised federation, Canadian provinces entertain their autonomy. While competition between national governments and their regional tiers form an inherent characteristic of American and Canadian federalism, both countries have also enjoyed collaboration among federal units to make extraordinary achievements. Many countries have learned and adopted the federal model from the United States and Canada as a promising federal system to meet governance, security, economic and social challenges back home. However, Canadian and American federalism are not perfect and are themselves looking for better solutions to some of the problems challenging them. One of the major issues these two old and mature federal systems are trying to fix is the increasing tensions between federal and regional governments over managing and balancing self-rule with shared-rule.
The main purpose of this research is to provide a comparative overview of constitutional power sharing in Canadian and American federal systems. The analytical framework of this comparative analysis focuses on the integration of self-rule and shared-rule principles and is highlighted in two primary aspects. First, lack of standardised federal theory complicates the understanding of institutional arrangements of self-rule and shared-rule in federal systems. In other words, different federal theories, of different scholars, have proposed either complex or partial views on how federalism is conceived and adopted. Second, federal principles have significant influence in dividing and exercising autonomy and interdependence. Although constitutional powers are shared between federal units, how they are shared and how federal actors are exercising the given authorities in their sovereign territories are determined by which principles a particular federal system conceives. Moreover, intergovernmental relation is a mirror of how federal system is adopted and operated. Intergovernmental interactions are not just administrative functions aimed at preventing and managing a particular policy issue. It is an essential element of federal system guided by the principles of autonomy and interdependence that require trust and partnership on a regular basis. The two aspects of how autonomy, or self-rule, and interdependence, or shared-rule, will be analysed in the federal context of American and Canadian political systems.
Chapter 1: Literature Review on Federalism
A. Introduction
Federalism is comparatively a new phenomenon that provides local alternatives to some of the complex political challenges governments are facing in many parts of the world. With technological advancement, the industrial revolution, rising living standards, and interconnectedness as a result of globalisation, have changed the relationship between citizens and their states. Citizens are now a key stakeholder in changing dynamics of global governance that goes beyond administrative territories who demand improved and efficient government systems which are closer and accountable to them. To meet such demands of public goods and direct interaction between citizen and state, traditional forms of government system more often struggle to provide. Governments of the world can, generally, be categorized in three forms: unitary system, where power is centralised at the national level and the subunits or the constituent units receive very little authority; confederation system, which is a union of equal government units and little power is granted at the national level; and federal system, where centre and state governments hold exclusive powers (known as self-rule) and some powers are shared between them (known as shared rule). While unitary systems widely practice decentralisation to reach to the people, federal systems can also adopt a decentralised mode of federalism. There is, however, a clear difference between decentralisation and federalism. In decentralisation or devolution of power, the central government grants certain powers to the local level, and that can be withdrawn at the discretion of centre. On the contrary, powers are constitutionally divided between federal tiers in federalism, and that can’t be withdrawn without a constitutional amendment, which in many federal cases, require the consent of a majority of federal units.
This chapter provides the comparative analysis of key theories of federalism. Principles of self-rule and shared-rule are the primary focus of the analysis which looks into two primary aspects: lack of uniformity in the dominant theories of federalism complicates understanding of self-rule and shared-rule institutions in federal systems, and autonomy and interdependence dimensions of the federal system are directly influenced by federal principles. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section, the dominant theories of federalism, analyses key theoretical debates on federalism; federal terminologies, principles or types of federalism, and principles of self-rule and shared-rule. Second, and the last, section, synthesises the key theories of federalism and self-rule and shared-rule principles. While theoretical discussions on these three aspects of power sharing occupy this chapter, the assessed theoretical foundations will be used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 to study two case studies of the federal political system, the United States and Canada.
B. Dominant Theories of Federalism
Federalism emerged as an important approach to nation-state building after the World War II, after the collapse of European colonial empires (Watts, 1996). And aftermath of Cold War once again witnessed the surge of federalism because of two conflicting reasons: collapse of the former Soviet Union (USSR), and adoption of federalism as an effective way of dealing with the instability issue of multi-ethnic countries with the history of authoritarian regime and centralist nation-building projects (Aliff 2015: 74). Aliff further justifies the claims with examples of adoption of federalism in different countries: in Russia to manage the leftover of the former Soviet Union; in Ethiopia to manage ethic conflict after the collapse of military dictatorship, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina where international community enforced federalism to maintain stability aftermath of war and genocide. The trend continues in counties like Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan and recently in Nepal. There is hope, and mixed developments, in conflict-torn countries, that federalism, ethnic in some form, can manage the tensions in ethnically-divided communities by recognising the identity, culture and power sharing. While only four countries- Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States- had adopted federalism by the end of the World War-II, almost half of the world’s population now live in the 25 countries that now have adopted federal political system.
Modern advancements in the areas of science, technology, and industrialisation have created immense opportunities and challenges as well. Access to global communications has turned a remote village in any corner of the world in a global community of local citizens which Courchene (1995) describes as ‘glocalisation.’ This progress and open access to the world market, in turn, add additional challenges to the states to meet all the desires of their citizens. Expansion of globalisation is limiting self-sufficiency of the nation-states, that, at the same time, creates distance between citizens and states regarding the states being able to respond to the interests and demands of their citizen (Watts 2001: 23-24). To meet such diverse and evolving nature of citizen-state interactions, federalism provides a more effective governance system that has many alternatives to better connect citizens with the state. This claim is further elaborated by Inman and Rubinfeld (1997: 44) by highlighting the significance of federal systems in three aspects: encouragement of an efficient allocation of national resources; promotion of a sense of democratic community by fostering political participation; and protection and promotion of fundamental liberties and freedoms.
1. Theoretical debates on federalism
Federalism attracts numerous debates among scholars regarding definition, evolution, theories, principles and empirical cases. There, however, remains many areas in federal debates that are either under-researched or lack wider consensus. Agreement on the theory of federalism is one such area that is unclear, controversial and varies by theorists and contexts. Federalism as the term does not have agreements among the scholars (Duchacek (1987: 187). The term ‘federal’ is derived from Latin term ‘foedus’, which means covenant and so federalism is about partnership which is established and regulated by a covenant and which reflects the sharing between the partners based on mutual understanding and integrity of each partner (Elazar, 1987:5-6). The conventional debates on federalism, however, can be grouped by horizontal and vertical power sharing. Saxena (2011: xix) explains that the focus of earlier federal theories was focused on theoretical concepts of power sharing such as horizontal separation of powers between three federal units and vertical separation of powers between federal and regional governments.
As discussed earlier, the definition of federalism is highly debated and so it is useful to clarify the terms often used simultaneously. Federal political system is a descriptive term that refers to a broad range of political systems consisting of two or more level of government, combining elements of shared-rule through common institutions with regional self-rule through the constituent units (Elazar 1987). The broad range includes a whole spectrum of more specific non-unitary forms including ‘federations’ and ‘confederations.’ Federation refers to a strong constituent units of government and a general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly elected and accountable to its citizens. Federations enable both strong general and strong regional governments, each directly responsible to their citizens, but this is achieved at the price of some tendencies to complexity and legalisation (Watts, 2001:26). Federations represent one particular model in the federal political system and federations, neither the federal nor the constituent units of government are constitutionally subordinate to the other. Elazar (1993: 190) defines federation as a common general government where constituent units govern their constituencies and share a common constitutional government for all. The USA and Canada are the examples of federations. Confederation, on the other hand, represents a union which is formed by its constituent units, but the latter holds the most of the sovereignty and statutory authorities (1993: 190). The constituent units establish and control the general government which has to work through the units to serve their population. The European Union is a recent example of confederation.
Federalism, on contrary to confederation, implies to a political system which includes a constitutionally entrenched division of powers between a central government and two or more subunits, defined on a territorial basis, such that each level of government has sovereign authority over certain issues (Kymlicka, 1998: 119). Federalism ensures both self-rule regionally and shared-rule nationally (Elazar, 1987: 5-6). King (1982) explains federalism as a normative term referring to the provision of multi-tiered government consisting the elements of shared and regional self-rule and based on presumed value of achieving both unity and diversity by accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identities within a larger political union. For Wheare (1964: 62), federalism is a system of government that represents primarily a division of powers between general and regional authorities, and each of them exercises their powers independently, in their jurisdiction, and in cooperation with each other. Similar to Wheare, Scott (2011:1) defines federalism as the government authority divided into constituent parts where each part maintains autonomy within its realm, but the possibility of collaboration between constituent parts remains. Furthermore, Erbsen (2008: 500) explains federalism, from a descriptive perspective, ‘a shorthand moniker for a complex set of political, legal, and economic relationships within a system of divided sovereignty.’
To sum up the definitions of various scholars, earlier versions of federalism theory were focused on the vertical and horizontal distribution of powers whereas the definition, as evolved during and after the 18th century, looks at federalism as partnership arrangements which constitutionally share powers with the federal units. While self-rule denotes the autonomy, which allows the independent exercise of constitutional authorities in their given jurisdiction, the shared-rule represents interdependence, which demands some form of collaboration between the federal units. Different federal theorists have used several approaches and interpretations while defining federalism, however, there are some similar characteristics that exist in most of these definitions. For example, constitutional division of powers between federal units and independency and interdependencies while exercising the authorities are common features across varying definitions of federalism.
2. Principles or types of federalism
Federalism signifies autonomy and collaboration between two or more levels of governments in a political system. It resonates trust, mutual understanding and integrity of each federal tiers. However, how these values are inherited and adopted in theory and practice vary significantly. There is not any uniform principles or types of federalism that standardise self-rule and shared-rule dimensions of a federal system. Different theorists and scholars in federal studies propose different models of federalism. Aliff (2015:74) distinguishes federalism, in general term, in seven types: dual, cooperative, competitive, asymmetric, market preserving, confederal government and multi-level governance. Young (Young 2014) groups these categories in collective, cooperative, and process federalism. A group of scholars divides the varieties in two; judicial, or the rule of law, and structural federalism (Bednar et al. 2001). To continue the classification, Donald Kettl (2004: 102-117) refers to administrative federalism whereas Tim Conlan (2006) terms opportunistic federalism to the contemporary federalism which is more exploitative, and contemptuous than just being coercive. There are theories of federalism that divide the types of federalism by political aims that led to the formation and maintenance of a federal system. Lehmann (2002: 2) labels it by integrative federalism, with the aim of unity among previously independent political entities, and devolutionary federalism, with the aim of redistributing the powers of a previously unitary country.
There have been numerous debates on cooperative federalism possibly because cooperation is a key element of federalism. Kincaid (1990:140), recognises cooperative federalism as an arrangement of power sharing between federal units that accommodates political change without violence and compensates state and local authorities for ‘federal intrusions’ in their jurisdictions with economic incentive based on the assumption that policy processes pose unnecessary burden to the state and local officials. Elazar (1964:250) highlights four elements of cooperative federalism: federalist theory of government; a dual governmental structure; with some degree of cooperative programmes; and some administrative systems or techniques for intergovernmental collaboration. Although Elazar defined these four elements in the context of intergovernmental interactions in the United States, these are still relevant to the study of collaborative federalism elsewhere. Cooperative federalism, however, focuses primarily on non-judicial actors and the biggest lack is an ‘adequately-specified’ normative theory (Schapiro 2005). Scholars, like Schapiro and Elazar, recognise that the theory of cooperative federalism does little to resolve the conflict that may arise in the relationship between states and federation.
Critics claim that cooperative federalism provides insufficient details of the relationship between federal units. As a result, competitive federalism presents more dynamic, innovative and effective policy alternatives and helps make federal units for competitive (Scharpf, 1988:239-278). Competitive federalism requires the governments, both federal and state, to be more efficient and responsive to provide public goods and services (Breton 1987). Vertical competition between national and regional governments and horizontal competition between regional tiers represent competitive federalism. Kasper (1994:9-11) highlights four key characteristics of competitive federalism: subsidiary, centralisation of decision making is required only if it is more efficient than provided at the state level; rule of origin, any services or products qualified in one state should be accepted everywhere else; assignment of tasks, duplication of authorities and functions should be avoided; and fiscal equivalence, each federal units are responsible for generating revenue in addition to citizens to pay for government services. Thus, competitive federalism not just focus on political responsiveness, interconnected but also demands economic efficiencies to better serve its constituencies.
All these three types of federalism, follow the logics of Tiebout model (1956). Economic federalism is better for economic efficiency- the lower-tier government is more efficient for congestible public services whereas central government is best suited for public goods and inter-jurisdictional spillovers. On the opposite, cooperative federalism tends to assign public goods and spillovers to the local-tier government and depends on inter-jurisdictional bargaining to decide on such service delivery arrangements. And democratic federalism holds public goods and spillovers with the central government but leaves room for representation of local voices at the federal level.
In contrary to an earlier focus on fiscal efficiency, political objectives, cultural norms, and federal history, Colino (2013) have analysed different variables and configurations of existing twenty-seven federal counties and summed the varieties of federalism in four principles:
- Balance federalism focuses on balancing the power and the integrated constitutional design allows independent inter-state and intergovernmental relations. intergovernmental relations are self-assertive and usually party-oriented. Examples include Switzerland, Australia and the United States.
- Unitary federalism focuses on signifying the importance of consensus and cooperation among the federal units. This type of federal system adopts second chamber or house where representation from constituent units is ensured in federal decisions. Intergovernmental relations are interdependent as authorities are shared. Examples include Germany and South Africa.
- Segmented federalism refers to the federal system with two or more cultural groups coexist and so values cultural affirmation at the most. Characteristics such as autonomy, interdependence, and harmonisation require agreement between cultural and intergovernmental institutions. Intergovernmental relations are independent and competitive because authorities are exclusive and separated. Examples include Switzerland and Canada.
- Accommodation federalism refers to the federal system with cultural heterogeneity and values autonomy and cultural identity which often leads to asymmetric arrangement to meet the demands of self-rule. Although the balance of powers is guaranteed, federal government controls the devolution. The intergovernmental relations, generally, are interdependence and often hierarchical. Examples include Spain and India.
Summarising Colino, the constitutional design of a federal system plays a significant role regarding setting up the political objectives, interactions between cultural and political institutions, the constitutional design of power division, participation of constituent units in the federal decision-making processes, and institutional arrangements to maintain a balance between self-rule and shared-rule. Also, different principles of federalism may present in one particular federal system. The next section elaborates self-rule and shared-rule and how federal theories influence the institutional arrangements of power sharing in federalism.
3. Self-rule and shared-rule
As discussed earlier while defining federalism, federalism is derived from Latin word foedus. Foedus means pact or treaty. So, the core of federalism lies with treaty-based agreement to form a union between and among different (previous) territories or regions. This treaty-based agreement is based on how institutional arrangements of a federal system divides and balances autonomy (self-rule) and interdependence (shared-rule). While the attention is, naturally, directed towards the territorial division and autonomy, the approaches on interdependence, between the federal units, vary across federal systems. And these variances lead to differing institutional architectures regarding how autonomy and sovereignty are arranged, maintained and sustained under federal-state dynamics.
The federal-state relations, for some scholars, can be divided into two categories: one which represents the states as a competitor to the federal government and the second which entertains states not as autonomous but as allies to implement federal policies (Bulman-Pozen & Gerken 2009: 1256). Federalism consists of divided and shared sovereignty under the concept of non-centralisation, and the core of federalism lies with balancing the self-rule and shared rule within a statutory boundary (Fossum & Jachtenfuchs 2017: 477). The principle of balancing between units makes federalism more dynamic than other forms of governance, and this also demands that the problem related to balancing the power between self and shared rule has to be resolved in mutually-agreeable way to thrive the federal cultures. Elazar (1993: 190) defines federalism as intergovernmental relations, in the narrower term, and like the blend of self-rule and shared rule by constitutionalised power sharing in a non-centralised manner, in a broader term. Constitutionally guaranteed and authorities divided are the main characteristics of diffusion of power in a federal system (Elazar, 1964: 249). Two basic institutional mechanisms serve as the building blocks of a federal system: self-rule and shared-rule (Broschek 2016): 26. How does a particular federal system determine the jurisdiction and interdependence of self and shared rule? Such arrangements can either be located on one side (self-rule/autonomy) or the other side (shared-rule/interdependence) or even in between these two principles, as Broschek (2014) defines, featuring a more balanced ‘juxtaposition’ of the both. However, maintaining a balance between self-rule and shared-rule is often a challenging task, even for an established federal system.
The allocation of powers in a federal system is ideally aimed at allowing each of the federal units to independently exercise the given authorities in their jurisdiction/territory (Wheare, 1963: 14), in practice, however, it is very difficult to avoid the overlapping of responsibilities (Watts, 2008: 84) and that demands appropriate measures to manage and balance independency and interdependency between federal units. Watts (2008:84-85) further enlightens three patterns of processes, which not just lead to the establishment of a federal system, but also influences the allocation of powers.
- First, cases of aggregation, where pre-union territories or colonies gave up some of their previously-entertained sovereign powers to establish a new federal system. In this case, the federal government is provided with limited number of exclusive and concurrent powers and residual powers are granted to the regional governments. The American and Swiss federal systems are examples.
- Second, cases of devolution, when a previously-unitary country adopted the process of devolution to establish a new federal system. In this case, the powers of regional units are specified but the residual powers remain with the federal government. Belgium, Spain and Nepal are examples.
- Third, a combination of aggregation and devolution, where processes of previously mentioned two cases are merged. This combination arranges exclusive powers to the federal and provincial governments and concurrent powers with residual powers to the federal government. India, and Canada are the examples.
Thus, aggregation, devolution and combination both processes have direct influence over how a federal system is established and how power allocation is arranged. Furthermore, intergovernmental dynamics, cultural factors, and legal systems also play decisive roles regarding how constitutional powers are allocated and exercised (2008:84-85). Moreover, a federal system with civil laws has clearly specified powers. While the mixture of common or civil laws or even adoption of common laws do not necessarily make a significant difference (Arshakyan, 2013:1333-1334), legal precedents, cultural attitude of the judicial and legal professionals, and political struggle play influential role in how powers and jurisdiction are constitutionally interpreted in a particular federal system.
C. Conclusions
The chapter thoroughly assessed the conceptualisation of federal theories which determine the institutional arrangements of self-rule and shared-rule in a federal system. The assessment dealt with dominant theories of federalism, which included federal debates, principles or types of federalism, and finally the characteristics of self-rule and shared-rule which looked into key principles of power sharing and how different federal theories influence how power dynamics occur in federal systems. Furthermore, review also included how federal principles influence the division and realisation of autonomy and interdependence.
The federal system is one of the three categories of governments in the world; unitary and confederation are the other two forms. Scholars have different opinions about the emergence of federalism. Such opinions include, but not limited to, an important approach to nation-state building after the World War-II, end of European colonisation, and aftermath of the Cold War; an effective way of dealing with instability and fragmentation; management of ethnic conflict and insurgencies; and enforcement by the international community to deal with post-conflict crisis. Evolving nature of citizen-state interaction also demands a closer, and locally-accountable governance system and federalism can provide a better option which is efficient, participatory and ensures individual and collective liberty.
The definition of federalism differs at a great length, by scholars and political systems. However, key principles of federalism exist in almost all definitions. These include vertical and horizontal power sharing, self-rule and share-rule, and constitutional diffusion of power division and partnership between federal units. Federalism refers to a political system with constitutional division of powers between at least two layers of the governments, typically national and state/province, have sovereign authority to each layer of the governments, practice self-rule and shared-rule, and although independent in duties and functions but collaborate and compete with each other under the same constitution. Similar to the definition, federalism does not have uniformity regarding its types. Numerous theorists, both old and new, propose simple, mixed and complex types of federalism. Territorial structure, economic competency, a political objective, social norms, democratic values, administrative performance, variables and characteristics are some of the primary elements used to categorise the principles or types of federalism. Nevertheless, key features of federalism, such as autonomy and collaboration, power sharing between federal units, symmetric and asymmetric dynamics, horizontal and vertical intersections and intergovernmental relations serve as building blocks of the principles of federalism.
The most significant characteristics of a federal constitution are the inclusion of multiple tiers of government units with authorities and policy domains described for each of the federal units. A general rule of federal constitution includes the number of local level units, representation of those units in the central level institutions, such as legislature and policy bodies, and the description of their role, rights, responsibilities and jurisdiction. In other words, the constitution defines the scopes and limitations of self-rule for local-tier governments and shared rule between the federal units. The dynamics of self-rule and shared-rule can meaningfully help understand the institutional architectures of a federal system. More alignment towards self-rule shapes either more centralised or decentralised federalism and more alignment towards shared-rule lead to less centralised or decentralised federal system (Broschek 2016: 25-29). Furthermore, integration of federal theories, intergovernmental dynamics, social and cultural norms, legal systems and arrangements of three primary divisions of a state- legislative, executive, and judiciary- all play decisive roles in shaping the constitutional ground for power allocation, management, and interactions between federal units.
Chapter 2: Case Study 1: Federalism in the United States
A. Introduction
The United States adopted federalism in 1789 as the first modern federation in the world. The United States, at present, houses 326 million populations and consists of 50 states including 2 federacies, 3 associated states, 3 local home-rule territories, 3 unincorporated territories and over 130 native American domestic dependent nations (Watts, 2008). Adoption of federalism was the result of the failure of the Articles of Confederation, in 1781, mainly due to the conflict that divided the delegates, to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, in two factions; power centralisation at the national level or too powerful centre leads to tyranny. Eventually, the US Constitution, of 1777 and 1787, made a vertical and horizontal division of powers between centre and states. American federal system is one of the mature federations in the world with many unique features. Principles of checks and balances are well integrated in the US constitution. Although, federal laws are supreme and the Supreme Court verdict is the final, power-sharing between federal and state governments is explicitly provisioned in the federal constitution. The Constitution grants powers and also ensures that while federal units can entertain their authorities, some prohibitory measures are put in place to avoid confrontation between the federal-state and state-state authorities.
This case study examines American federalism focusing on two main features: integration of federal theories of self-rule and shared-rule in constitutional power sharing and in managing intergovernmental relations. We begin with the evolution of federalism in the United States. Further, the federal arrangements of power allocation to the national and state governments is followed by a power struggle and intergovernmental relations (IGR) management. While the Constitution allocates powers, some institutions are engaged in promoting coordination and collaboration between federal units. Finally, the conclusions synthesise the key theories that influenced American federalism, the linkage between federal principles and power sharing in American federalism.
B. American Federalism
The British expansion in the New World began in the 16th century and 16 colonies, later merged into 13, were established alongside the Atlantic coastline of the American continent (Leach 1981): 12. The colonies achieved their independence in 1776, and 20 additional colonies joined the original 13 colonies by 1860. Hawaii and Alaska integrated into the Union in 1959, and the addition of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rio and District of Columbia completed the territorial boundaries in the United States. The conflict between making the central powerful or more than sufficient powerful centre may lead to a tyranny caused the failure of the Articles of Confederation. And federalism, thus, was adopted to balance the power between federal and state governments. Initially establishing a confederation, a federal democratic republican system was later adopted in the USA after overthrowing the British colonial power. The American constitutions of 1777 and 1787 are the first written constitutions in the modern democracies in the world that limited the governmental power by vertical separation and horizontal division of authorities (Saxena, 2011: xv).
1. Power sharing in the United States
The American Constitution was signed on 17 September 1787 by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia (USGPO 2007). To protect certain liberties as the core of English and American political traditions, and increase the people’s trust in public institutions, the Bill of Rights was ratified on 15 December 1791. Guided by the principles of checks and balances, three organs of government share the powers:
- Article 1 of the Constitution grants all legislative powers to the Congress which represent; a Senate and House of Representatives. The Senate consists of 100 elected senators, representing 2 senators per state. The House of Representatives has 435 representatives and the respective states’ population determine the number of representatives (USA, n.d.).
- The executive power, under Article II, is vested in the President who is also the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the US. The President is supported by Vice President and Cabinet members.
- Under the Article III, the Supreme Court is granted with all judicial powers including, but not limited to, the controversies between two or more States. The Supreme Court is the highest court with 9 justices- one Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices- nominated by the President but need Senate’s approval. The Congress establishes lower level Federal Courts to handle federal affairs as provisioned in the Constitution (USCourt, n.d.).
The American federal units represent 3 types of governments; federation, state and local. District of Columbia is the special state besides 50 federal states. Local governments are divided into two categories; general and special purpose. General purpose governments consist of county, municipality and township. On the other hand, special purpose local governments include special and independent school districts. At present, 90,108 different government units consolidate US government as a whole (USCensusBureau 2012).
The Constitution of the Unites States divides powers to the federal units. While each of the states in the United States has their constitution, such state constitution must not contradict with the US Constitution. Under the US Constitution, centre, or federal, and states are provided with exclusive powers whereas some powers are shared by both federal units. The central government is provided with three types of power: delegated, implied and inherent powers (US History, n.d.):
- Delegated powers of the central government are provisioned in the Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution and that includes twenty-seven powers such as power to print bills and coins (money), power to declare war and establish and manage army, and to regulate commerce with states and foreign countries (USGPO, 2007:4).
- Implied powers are not clearly mentioned in the Constitution. But, the Constitution, under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18, possesses the constitutional basis for the implied powers of the national government. This is often called the necessary and proper clause that allows the Congress to ‘make laws…necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government…’
- Moreover, some of the Inherent powers are included in the Constitution, but not all and the such powers are retained by the national government to maintain the existence and integrity of the country as a political unit (Sidlow & Henschen 2012).
While the Constitution of the United States grants powers to the federal and state governments, the local governments receive powers from the state government. A study found that the states differ significantly in their methods regarding regulating the local government structures (ACIR 1993): iii. While state governments determine the local government structures and specific duties in many cases, the local citizens, on the other hand, were delegated the authority, also known as home rule, to prefer the form of local government and four primary areas; structure, function, fiscal authority and/or personnel recruitment and management of local governments (1993:3-5). As discussed in the earlier part of this section, the supremacy clause (Article VI, Clause 2) of the Constitution allows the federal government to pass a law pre-empting the area where both federal and state governments hold concurrent powers, and in that case, the state government has to accept and act on federal government’s decision.
2. Managing autonomy and interdependence through intergovernmental relations
The qualitative integration of autonomy and interdependence is reflected in how a federal system manages interactions between federal actors. Similarly, arrangements of intergovernmental agencies (IGA), frequency of their interaction, and implementation of commitments also reveal the depth of trust, and partnership between them. Intergovernmental relations (IGR) between federal and state governments in the United States, however, have changed overtime. There are over 200 congressional liaison offices in the US, and each of them attempts to coordinate with federal, state and local governments in their way (Crane-Hirsch 2017). Congressional, Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs (CLIA) serves as a primary interface between the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and state, local and tribal governments and promote dialogue on legislations and regulations (OPM, n.d.). Established in 1939, the Executive Office of the President (EOP) plays a vital role in implementing the national policies- mainly the President’s policy priorities- with different governmental units (WhiteHouse, n.d.). Beside the White House, different departments have their units to promote IGR. On the horizontal side, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, n.d.), Council of State Governments (CSG, n.d.) and National Governors Association (NGA, n.d.) promote dialogue and collaboration among states, territories and commonwealths of the United States. The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI, n.d.), US Conference of Mayors (US Mayors, n.d.), and National League of Cities (NLC, n.d.) are struggling to raise the concerns of tribal and local governments and advocate for more authorities and resources to meet the growing demands of their constituent citizens.
Numerous agencies are simultaneously engaged in intergovernmental coordination which not just complicates the consistency of the process, but also creates fragmentation, duplication, funding crisis and disputes over the jurisdiction of coordinating agencies. And most of these agencies are either limited to vertical coordination or horizontal interaction. The relationship between federal and states and constituent local governments is not uniform in each state. Zimmermann (Zimmerman 2001):29) illustrates various issues that affect the uniformity of relationship between centre, state and local governments such as the wealth of the states, negotiation capacity, the influence of state’s delegation to the Congress, and discretionary authorities of the regional bodies functioning under the federal government. Finally, the American IRG involve various actors, in very fluid and informal interactions which can be characterised by ‘organised chaos’ (Kincaid 2000).
C. Conclusions
The American case study focused on two main features: interaction between principles of self-rule and shared-rule and power sharing between federal units; and intergovernmental relations to manage and balance autonomy and interdependence.
American federal system experienced most of the principles of federalism discussed in the first chapter; dual, competitive, cooperative, fiscal, balanced, and so-called ‘new federalism.’ The Constitution of the United States delegates powers to the federal and state governments only and local governments depend on the respective states to obtain and exercise powers. Although each of the states has their constitutions, the Constitution of the United States supersedes all. The federal government entertains three types of powers: delegated, implied and inherent. Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution grants reserved powers to the state governments. However, states cannot adopt any law that contradicts with the federal constitution. Moreover, federal and state governments both receive exclusive powers (self-rule) and concurrent powers to be shared between federal and state governments (shared-rule).
The growing concerns over federal government’s authorities helped the states to regain their powers. Despite these attempts, with some positive results achieved so far regarding balancing the power between federal units, the federal authorities, under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, allows the federal government to adopt and enforce laws on the state governments. Asymmetric federalism is a common phenomenon in American federal system. Despite the US Constitution treating all states equally, states, and even local governments, have different influence over federal authorities due to their geographic and population size, economic status, party affiliation and acquaintances with the federal authorities. The Constitution also prevents conflict between states by adopting some legal arrangements known as full faith and credit. Conflict over jurisdiction or power or interpretation of laws are subject to the arbitration by the Supreme Court, and such verdicts are final. However, numerous cases of disputes between federal units exist in the United States waiting for final decision.
The power struggle between federal and state governments has been a regular phenomenon of American federalism since the inception. Intergovernmental agencies are fragile, and lacks mandates, resources and transparency over procedures. Intergovernmental relations are generally vertically managed, centralised and produce non-binding resolutions. Lack of efficient IGR, principles of self-rule and shared-rule often get ignored by powerful actors, both at federal and state levels raising question over the implementation of constitutional value of autonomy and interdependence.
Case Study 2: Federalism in Canada
A. Introduction
Canada lies in North America having a border with the United States in the south and the Arctic Circle in the north. With a population of 36 million, Canada, by size, is the second largest country in the world, after Russia. Canada is a constitutional monarchy and was declared confederation in 1867. Upper Canada (present Ontario), Lower Canada (present Quebec), and the Atlantic Colonies (now Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island) formed the Canadian Confederation. Canada exercises Westminster-styled parliamentary democracy and has a bicameral legislature. The Queen of the United Kingdom is the head of state, and the elected prime minister is the head of government. The Constitution of Canada is a blend of written and unwritten statutes, custom and judicial decisions and the written constitution consists of the Constitution Act of 1867 and the Constitution Act of 1982. While the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of the country, the Canadian Charter of the Rights and Freedoms provides various rights such as fundamental rights and equality rights.
This case study examines Canadian federalism focusing on two main features: integration of federal theories of self-rule and shared-rule in constitutional power sharing and in managing intergovernmental relations. We begin with the evolution of federalism in Canada. Further, the federal arrangements of power allocation to the national and state governments is followed by a power struggle and intergovernmental relations (IGR) management. While the Constitution allocates powers, some institutions are engaged in promoting coordination and collaboration between federal units. Finally, the conclusions synthesise the key theories that influenced federalism in Canada, the linkage between federal principles and power sharing in Canadian federalism.
B. Canadian Federalism
New France, a colony, established in 1534, annexed to the British empire in 1763 when French lost the war during Seven Years’ War (1756-1763). Several other colonies and territories joined and became the Dominion of Canada (LAC, n.d.). During 1791-1867 when the Canadian Confederation was formed, the pre-Confederation Canada observed the formation and merging of Upper Canada (now Ontario), Lower Canada (now Quebec), and the Atlantic Colonies (now Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island). The internal conflict in the United States, during 1861-1865, also made an impact on the North American colonies of the British empire. The Charlottetown Conference, in September, and Quebec Conference, in October 1864 followed by the London Conference in during December 1866 and March 1867 paved very important steps towards the formation of Canadian Confederation in 1867.
The era of the 1970s and early 1980s was considered as competitive federalism in Canada since the competition between federal and provincial governments was noticeably high (Simeon and Robinson 1990). The era was also known for the struggle between the national and provincial governments over provincial welfare, revenue sharing and vertical jurisdiction. Many scholars claim that Canadian federalism and competitiveness are intertwined (Simmons, 2008:7). The national and provincial governments both are granted with exclusive powers by the Canadian Constitution. There are many policy areas where both layers of the federal units have to work together. For instance, the Canadian Constitution does not explicitly mention whether environmental issues lie with national or provincial governments. But, the national government has the authority to sign international treaties whereas the provincial governments possess the jurisdiction to implement such policies.
Economic differences among the provinces made the affluent provinces aggressive about their prosperity and that helped the emergence of stronger provinces in Canada (Leach 1984). Leach recalls that there are two other reasons which made the provinces more autonomous and strong. First, the Canadian parliamentary system provides incentives to develop individual provinces, and second, transfer of funds from the federal government to the provinces for varieties of social development programmes which helped the provinces to increase their revenue whereas federal regulations remained minimised. In addition to Leach’s explanation behind stronger provinces in Canada, the territorial structure of Canadian federalism also poses a serious challenge to any endeavours of centralising the powers (Lecours 2017). Although negotiated during the late 1990s, trading non-constitutional pacts between the federal units are now a regular part of Canadian federalism, that (Simmons 2008):5-6 calls Treaty federalism. Canadian provinces are getting more autonomy due to this treaty federalism. Simmons reveals that because in the absence of smooth way to amend the constitution through formal channels, treaty federalism provides an alternative to negotiate between national and provincial governments.
1. Power sharing in Canada
The Canadian Constitution has defined three distinct branches of the government to ensure checks and balances; executive (decision-making), legislative (law-making) and the judiciary (interpreter of the law).
- The Canadian Constitution (1897), under Part III, provisions the Queen, of the United Kingdom, to possess the executive powers in Canada and her powers are entertained by the Executive Council, who is advised by the ministers (DoJ, 2013:3). These ministers should have the confidence of the House of Commons. A cabinet, led by a prime minister and other ministers, is responsible for executive functions of the country.
- The legislative powers, under Part IV of the Constitution (1897), are vested in the parliament and the parliament consists of the Governor General, representing the Queen, the Senate and the House of Commons. The Senate is represented by 105 appointed Senators and those consist of three divisions; Ontario, Quebec and the Maritime Provinces, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick- 24 from each of the divisions. The House of Commons consist of 338 elected members- also known as Members of Parliament (MPs).
- Part VII of the Constitution Act (1897), provisions judiciary in Canada. The Supreme Court is the highest court in Canada and makes the final judgement regarding any question regarding the Constitution, and serious cases of private and public law. Canadian judicial system carries the legacies of French and British colonisations in the form of two legal traditions that coexist at present in Canada; civil law in Quebec and common law in rest of Canada.
Canada exercises three levels of government; federal, provincial and municipal. Initially consisting of 4 provinces, Canada, at present, consists of 10 provinces (Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, British Colombia, Prince Edward Island, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador) and 3 territories (Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut) (GoCa, n.d.). Sub-section 92.8 of the Constitution Act (1867) grants the provinces to have municipalities under them and so the provincial governments are responsible for the jurisdiction and limitations of the municipal government. Local governments in Canada was predominantly envisioned to deliver services to the people rather than functioning as a part of federal system. Canadian local governments have two general purposes: to serve as a political mechanism to achieve community objectives, and to provide public service to their constituent citizens (Lazar & Seal 2005). There are 3,598 municipal councils, 143 regional councils and 2 supra-regional councils in Canada (CLGF 2015). British Columbia and Ontario have regional councils but only Quebec has supra-regional council.
To adopt the self-rule principle, the federal and provincial governments are constitutionally provided with exclusive powers (Table 4). Whereas under the shared-rule principle, agriculture, immigration and old age pension are three concurrent powers shared between federal and provincial governments. Furthermore, under Section 94 of the Constitution Act (1982) (DoJ, 2013:32), three provinces- Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick- have legislations for uniformity of all or any laws corresponding to property and civil rights. Regarding old age pensions and supplementary benefits, the Parliament of Canada may make laws, but such laws should not challenge the provincial legislation in this regard (Section 94 [A]). The Parliament of Canada and provincial legislatures possess the concurrent power to make laws regarding agriculture and immigration (Section 95). However, provincial laws related to agriculture and immigration should not be objectionable to any Act of the Parliament of Canada.
2. Managing autonomy and interdependence through intergovernmental relations
Competitiveness is one of the key features of Canadian federalism. Vertical competition between the leaders of provincial and federal government in addition to the horizontal competition is apparent in Canadian federal system. Many issues are contributing to tense the intergovernmental relationships in Canada. Canadians have concentrated the executive authority in a parliamentary system to practice a competitive and asymmetric decision-making at the federal level, and there are growing concerns over the increasing authority of the prime minister (Sayers & Banfield 2013):186. Although the Senate has the power to veto the legislative process, it generally functions as the advisory council to the prime minister. Similarly, the autonomy and powers of the provinces in Canada also weaken the federal government’s capacity to implement major policy decisions.
The Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat functions as the advisor to the Prime Minister, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and Cabinet members on federal and provincial/territorial relations. However, the focus of this official, yet not a part of Canadian Constitution, intergovernmental relations is limited to federal and provincial and territorial governments (GoCb, n.d.). Most of the intergovernmental agreements are not legally binding and lack systematisation (Anderson 2015): 8. Federal and provincial/territorial institutions have also established other channels to promote intergovernmental cooperation such as Canada Revenue Agency (GoCc, n.d.), Council of Ministers of Education (CMEC, n.d.), Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME, n.d.) and Canada Institute for Health Information (CIHI, n.d.). The Council of the Federation is a forum of 13 provincial and territorial heads to promote interprovincial/territorial cooperation (CoF, n.d.). Similarly, Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM, n.d.) is a network of most of the Canadian municipalities that advocate for more powers and influence over federal and provincial governments.
Finally, IGR in Canada is vertical and horizontal but unquestionably bilateral; engage either the national government and provincial/territorial governments or provincial/territorial and local governments. IGR is rather informal and issue based. Although some formal institutions are set up and interactions held on regular basis, but the lack of legal obligations and commitments from higher level authorities tend to focus more on issues that benefit or concern them rather than to the ordinary citizens.
C. Conclusions
The Canadian case study focused on two main features: interaction between principles of self-rule and shared-rule and power sharing between federal units; and intergovernmental relations to manage and balance autonomy and interdependence.
The Canadian case of federalism is a mixture of competitive and cooperative federalism as discussed in the first chapter. The federal and provincial governments, both, entertain exclusive powers (self-rule) and concurrent powers (shared-rule). The power division between federal and provincial governments is very distinctive and there are just three powers they share together; agriculture, immigration and old age pension. The features of power sharing allow plenty of room to the provincial governments to enjoy autonomy and sovereignty and while this benefits the prosperity and liberty of provinces, this also adds challenges to the federal government to adopt and implement national policy decisions. However, the residuary powers- not explicitly allocated to the provincial/territorial governments in the Constitution, are granted to the federal government. When powers, concurrent, are shared between the federal and provincial governments, and if any conflict arises over the jurisdiction, the federal laws supersede the provincial laws. Moreover, the federal parliament can make laws regarding the old age pensions and supplementary benefits, but, such laws should not challenge the provincial legislation. On the other hand, provincial laws regarding agriculture and immigration should not contradict with any relevant act/s of the federal parliament.
Canada adopts bilateral intergovernmental relations; takes place either between the federal and provincial/ territorial governments or provincial/ territorial and local/ municipal governments. In addition to few formal IGA, there are other smaller and more issue-specific entities that try to strengthen the IGR between and among federal and other constituent actors. IGR in Canada, however, is more informal, issue specific, centralised to either federal or provincial/territorial leaderships and the decisions are not legally binding. Autonomy and influence of provincial governments also limit the federal government’s capacity to implement policy decisions. In turn, the federal government uses fiscal autonomy to buy the provincial influence and support. As a result, the buying capacity of the federal government- or federal executives- drives the intergovernmental relationships towards economic incentives. Thus, the power division in Canada, on the one hand, integrate some characteristics of competitive federalism, the policy implementation obligations with both units of the federalism, require them to cooperate with each other.
Chapter 3: Findings, Discussions and Conclusions
The research is focused on providing a comparative analysis of constitutional power sharing between federal units in the United States and Canada. While integration of self-rule and shared-rule provided the primary analytical framework for this comparative analysis, two specific objectives guided the research: to review the conceptualisation of federal theories that shape institutional arrangements of autonomy and interdependence in federal systems; and to study the influence of federal principles in dividing and exercising the constitutional powers with focus on power sharing and intergovernmental relations. This chapter is presented in two sections. First, major findings from the literature review and case studies from the American and Canadian federal systems. Second, a succinct version of analytical findings, the conclusions. Major findings are presented in four sections; institutional checks and balances, self-rules and shared-rules, management of intergovernmental relations, and preventing and managing disputes.
A. Findings and discussions
1. Institutional Checks & Balances
Both, the United States and Canada, have adopted the principle of checks and balances. In the United States, the Congress holds the legislative powers, the President and his Cabinet members hold the executive powers, and the Supreme Court holds the judicial powers. With some similarities with the United States, all legislative powers in Canada are granted to the Parliament, executive powers are entertained by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Queen. The judicial powers, in Canada, are granted to the Supreme Court. The American President and Canadian Prime Minister supreme enjoy executive powers, and there are growing concerns over the ‘discretion’ of these top executives in both countries, the Congress can challenge the President’s policies whereas, in Canada, the Prime Minister can bypass the Senate and easily influence the House of Commons. However, both executives have time and again used alternative routes, other than parliament, to decide and implement policies. While the common law is practised in both of the countries, Canada has adopted legal duality- practices common and civil law.
2. Self-Rules and Shared-Rules
Both, the United States and Canada, have a federal political system with 3 levels of governments; federal, state and local. However, local governments, in both of the country, fall under the jurisdiction of state/provincial governments. In addition to the federal government, 51 state and almost 90,000 local governments form the American federal system. On the other hand, a national government share federal system with 10 provinces, 3 territories and over 3,500 local governments in Canada.
The federal government in the United States is provided with delegated, implied, and inherent powers. While delegated powers, such as print money and declare war, are included in the American Constitution, implied powers are not obviously mentioned in the Constitution but the federal government, through the Congress, use this privilege to make laws as deemed necessary. The federal government in Canada, instead, is provided with exclusive and residuary powers. While exclusive powers are included in the Canadian Constitution, the residuary powers are not. This constitutional right lets the federal parliament to assume any powers not plainly provided to the provincial/territorial legislatures. State governments in the United States have constitutionally-granted exclusive powers (self-rule) that allow them to exercise the powers not delegated to the federal government, also known as reserved powers. But this privilege, in Canadian Constitution, is granted to federal government. However, the prohibitory powers in the American Constitution outlaw the states to exercise certain powers such as impose duties or taxes to good transported across states.
The United States, constitutionally, shares more powers with the state governments, known as concurrent or shared powers. On the contrary, agriculture, immigration and old age pensions are three areas where federal and provincial/territorial governments share powers in Canada. The Canadian federal government can make laws regarding old age pensions and related benefits, but such laws should not contradict the provincial legislation. To make the balance, the provincial/territorial law/s should not violate the federal laws regarding agriculture and immigration.
The federal political system in the United States centralise the powers to the federal government whereas, in Canada, a decentralised form of federalism is in practice making the provinces and territories more sovereign and autonomous. The federal government in the United States does not have to struggle as much as their counterpart in Canada to design and endorse national policies. Resistance from regional governments in the United States is also not as common and fierce as in Canada.
3. Managing Intergovernmental Relationships
There have been many changes regarding intergovernmental relations (IGR) in the USA. IGR was symbolic during 1789-1901 but emerged as a necessity during 1901-1960 as the US moved from dual federalism to cooperative federalism. There was a surge in federal government’s engagement with the constituencies during the 1960s and 1970s, and so IGR became a necessity of national government’s interaction with the states. Many federal agencies started networking with state and local level authorities for implementing national policy goals. There is, however, no uniformity of IGR in the USA and it varies by policy issue, size, wealth and influence of the federal units. IGR, in the USA, in short, is very informal and conditional. In Canada, however, there exist some established, and formal institutions and networks to promote IGR. However, these agencies are more issue specific, centralised to their leadership and their decisions are not legally binding.
4. Preventing and Managing Disputes
The Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution supersedes the state laws with the federal laws and any conflict over the jurisdiction should be resolved by the Supreme Court verdict. To avoid conflict among the states, the Full Faith and Credit clause of the US Constitution prevents and manages inter-state disputes. The federal government uses concurrent powers to manage disputes vertically, between national and state governments. And use the exclusive, implied, and inherent powers to coordinate relationship, both vertically and horizontally, and prevent and manage conflicts. The Prohibitory powers also avoid the conditions that could escalate conflicts among the states. The Canadian Constitution has adopted the principle of Equalisation that instructs the federal government to address inequalities and regional imbalances among the provinces/territories. Likewise, the Canadian Bijuralism, also referred as legal duality, has integrated common law and civil law (practised in Quebec only) into the formal justice system to avoid legal conflicts. The federal government also use the exclusive, residuary and concurrent powers to prevent, manage, and resolve tensions with and among provinces/territories.
B. Conclusions
Principles of self-rule and shared-rule place the foundation of any federal political system. As self-rule promotes autonomy because they direct power allocation to each of the federal units and facilitate them to exercise the given powers independently. On the other side, shared-rule principles advocate for power sharing between the federal units in a way that requires collaboration and coordination while exercising the given authorities. Even when federal systems follow the same principles of self-rule and shared-rule, institutional setup, mandates, jurisdiction, and intergovernmental relations vary from one country to other. What makes it different across federal countries? Many factors play a role because each federal system is a unique political system due to various features; the evolution, history, culture, politics, demography, geography, economy, and regional and international externalities. These features shape the formal and informal organisations and political behaviours of a state.
There are certain federal theories that have distinguished American political system with its neighbour, Canada. Recalling Broschek (2016), American federal system is influenced by the dualistic allocation of powers and comparatively strong shared-rule arrangements. Even when Canadian system of federalism is also influenced by dualistic allocation of constitutional powers, the shared-rule institutions are weak. Social and cultural factors, such as homogeneity and heterogeneity, also influence how powers are allocated (Watts, 2008). Homogenous society prefers to concentrate powers at the central level whereas diverse society shares more powers horizontally, to the regional units. The United States, as a homogenous society (although black and Hispanic groups form sizable population but do not constitute a majority in any of the American states), exercise centralised and strong federal government. Across the border, Canada enjoys diversity, regarding English and French speaking citizens, and that has resulted in more autonomous and independent provinces.
Despite the facts that principles of checks and balances are well integrated into American government systems, and pro-state decisions of the judiciary have played important role in strengthening the regional tiers, the federal government is accumulating more powers than ever using fiscal liberties, bypassing Congress and adopting alternative policy instruments. The gradual departure from cooperation to coercion is not just limited to American federal system, Canada is also copycatting its neighbour regarding manipulating legislature to implement certain federal mandates. Finally, theories and principles of federalism have some common normative grounds, but the application of those theories is far more complex and unexplored. Power sharing in the federal system is multifaceted which still need further research and interrogation than trying to fit within available knowledge.
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(This article is an edited version of the dissertation I submitted to the University of Sheffield as a requirement of MA in Governance and Public Policy. 2017)
Rakesh Karna 