Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) has produced one of Nepal’s sharpest electoral shocks, turning a party born only a few years ago into the largest force in a 275-member House and unseating heavyweight leaders across multiple provinces. Drawing on more than 3 million first-time young voters, an aggressive social‑media strategy, and an ambitious “Citizen Contract” that promises 7 percent annual growth, a USD 100 billion economy, and 30,000 MW of hydropower, RSP has engineered rather than merely ridden a protest wave. Yet it must now deliver in an economy where remittances exceed 25 percent of GDP, the trade deficit hovers near Rs 1 trillion, FDI has fallen by about 70 percent in six years, and climate change could shave off up to 2.2 percent of GDP by 2050. This article invites readers to look past the headlines and asks whether RSP can convert disruptive electoral energy into stable, inclusive institutions- cleaning up its own finance, sharing power with legacy and identity-based actors, and sequencing reforms- to avoid reproducing the very instability and exclusion it campaigned against.

Executive Summary

The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) has turned diffuse anti-establishment anger, youth aspirations, and urban frustration with service delivery into a coordinated electoral project that has reshaped Nepal’s House of Representatives since 2026. Its rise rests on three reinforcing pillars: a meta-narrative of anti-corruption and generational justice, digitally driven mobilization that compensated for an initially weak organization, and an ambitious but system-altering manifesto branded as a “Citizen Contract” and “100 Foundations for Policy Departure”.

This article argues that RSP’s breakthrough represents deliberate socio-political and economic engineering rather than a purely spontaneous protest vote. The party has used leadership symbolism, urban and semi-urban targeting, and sophisticated social‑media operations to convert protest energy into seats, while simultaneously repositioning itself as a pluralistic, performance-oriented alternative to legacy parties. Its manifesto seeks to recast the rules of the game through proposals for a directly elected executive prime minister, a fully proportional parliament, recall and NOTA (None of the Above) provisions, non-partisan local governments, and sweeping anti-corruption campaigns.

At the same time, the analysis shows that RSP’s ambition is constrained by deep structural vulnerabilities. Nepal remains trapped in remittance-driven, consumption-heavy growth; runs chronic trade deficits- especially with India and China; faces high climate and disaster risk; attracts very low and declining FDI; and is exposed to global shocks via migrants and oil prices. RSP’s economic and welfare promises, and its constitutional redesign agenda, will therefore require not only super‑majority coalitions and careful sequencing, but also credible reforms in party finance, state capacity, and center–province relations.

The article concludes that RSP can become a transformative- but not vengeful- system reformer if it shifts from personalized anti-establishment politics to institution‑building. That means cleaning up its own financing and internal democracy; building inclusive coalitions with legacy and identity-based parties; investing in federal and local capacities; and embedding climate resilience, migration policy, and regional energy trade into its core programme. Without such moves, its disruptive electoral engineering risks reproducing the instability, centralization, and exclusion it set out to overcome.

1. Context: Why RSP’s Win Was Possible

1.1 Structural disenchantment with legacy parties and governance fatigue

Nepal has experienced frequent government changes, coalition bargaining, and corruption scandals since the promulgation of the 2015 Constitution, eroding public trust in the Nepali Congress, CPN‑UML, Maoist Centre, and Madhesh-based parties. (4)(7)(8)(11) Years of unfulfilled promises on federal implementation, economic transformation, and service delivery generated strong demand for a political alternative, particularly in urban and peri-urban constituencies. (4)(10)(11) This environment created fertile ground for a party that framed itself as anti-corruption, technocratic, and generationally distinct from the post‑conflict leadership. (8)(9)(10)

1.2 Youth bulge, digital penetration, and protest politics

In the 2022–2026 cycle, over 3 million young Nepalis were eligible to vote, and around one million registered as first-time voters ahead of the 2026 general election, many of whom had previously engaged with politics primarily through social media and protest movements rather than party structures. (7)(8) Campaigns such as “My Vote Matters” and youth-led digital activism normalized political discourse on online platforms and made information flows less dependent on mainstream parties and media gatekeepers. (12)(13) RSP’s emergence built directly on this digitalized political sphere, where leaders like Balendra Shah had already demonstrated that outsider candidates with strong online brands could defeat entrenched parties in urban races. (8)(10)(11)(14)

2. Socio‑political Engineering Behind RSP’s Win

2.1 Meta‑narrative: Anti‑corruption, competence, and generational justice

RSP centered its discourse on corruption, impunity, and incompetence, portraying the existing establishment as a collusive cartel that captured the state for partisan and patronage gains. (1)(2)(7)(15) Rather than offering a classic left–right ideology, the party articulated “pluralistic democracy” with a liberal economy and social justice, framing politics as a question of performance, transparency, and inclusion across generations. (3)(15) This allowed RSP to attract both disillusioned middle‑class urban voters seeking efficient service delivery and working‑class youth angered by unemployment and migration‑driven precarity. (1)(2)(7)(8)

Table 1: RSP vs legacy parties: narrative and strategy

DimensionRSP “new politics”Legacy parties (NC, UML, Maoist, Madhesh-based)
Core narrativeAnti-corruption, competence, generational justiceStability, experience, legacy of democracy/peace process
Ideological framingPluralistic democracy, liberal economy with social justiceTraditional left/center‑left/centrist labels, often blurred
Primary baseUrban/semi-urban youth, middle class, diasporaOlder voters, rural strongholds, party‑cadre networks
Campaign modeSocial‑media-led, influencer-driven, data-assistedRallies, party organizations, and mainstream media
Leadership symbolismOutsider, anti-graft media star + rapper‑mayor + technocratsEx‑PMs, war‑era, and movement‑era leaders
Federal reform stanceDirectly elected executives, fully PR, non-partisan local govtIncremental change within the 2015 framework

2.2 Leadership design and symbolic politics

RSP’s leadership configuration was itself a form of socio‑political engineering. The combination of Rabi Lamichhane (media figure and anti‑graft crusader) and Balendra (Balen) Shah (rapper‑mayor with an insurgent urban governance brand) signaled a clean break from the war‑era leadership. (2)(7)(10)(5) The integration of figures like Swarnim Wagle (economist) and other technocratic gravitas to this outsider image. (16)(17)(18) This leadership mix helped the party speak simultaneously to urban youth, middle‑class professionals, diaspora constituencies, and sections of the private sector. (2)(10)(14)(17)

2.3 Electoral targeting and conversion of protest into votes

RSP concentrated on urban and semi‑urban constituencies- especially Kathmandu Valley and other city‑centered districts- where smartphone penetration, social media use, and frustration with municipal services were highest. (7)(8)(10)(11) Three‑ and four‑way splits among legacy parties in first‑past‑the‑post (FPTP) races allowed RSP to win seats with comparatively modest vote shares where anti‑establishment voters consolidated behind its candidates. (7)(8)(9) The party also deliberately aligned itself with the grievances that had driven youth‑led protests in 2025, transforming street‑level anger into a structured electoral project. (8)(10)(11)

3. Economic and Financing Dimensions of the “Engineering”

3.1 Economic messaging and middle‑class appeal

RSP’s manifesto emphasized productivity‑led growth, a liberal but socially just economy, and an explicit focus on middle‑class concerns such as taxation, cost of living, cooperative fraud, and access to quality public services. (1)(2)(19) Targets such as achieving an average 7 percent growth rate over five years, per capita income above USD 3,000, and a near‑USD 100 billion economy within 5- 7 years signaled an aspirational, catch‑up narrative to voters frustrated with stagnation. (1)(2) The party also addressed financial sector abuses, particularly in the cooperative sector, promising tighter regulation and consumer protection to respond to recent saving‑and‑credit scandals.

3.2 Party finance and transparency challenges

Despite its anti‑corruption rhetoric, RSP’s own financing practices mirror systemic weaknesses in party funding transparency. Investigations by Nepal Investigative Multimedia Journalism Network (NIMJN) show that RSP reported collecting approximately NPR 18.6 million in individual donations during the House of Representatives election year, but, like other major parties, did not disclose donor identities or sources in meaningful detail. (6) The party declared election expenses of only about NPR 1.577 million against these reported donations, raising questions about under‑reporting of expenditures and off‑book flows that also afflict other parties. (6) RSP’s official channels now solicit small donations through digital payment platforms, indicating an attempt to broaden its contributor base, but without robust public reporting and real‑time disclosure, its financing model does not yet fully embody the transparency it advocates. (6)(20)

4. Social Media and Digital Strategy

4.1 Strategic role of social media in RSP’s rise

Analyses of 2022 and subsequent elections indicate that RSP’s online presence significantly compensated for its initially weak traditional organization and was central to building a national brand in a short period. (7)(8)(12)(21) Kathmandu Post and other outlets note that RSP “emerged as the country’s fourth‑largest political force without its organization taking a concrete shape”, relying heavily on social media support that it aimed to convert into votes. (10)(12)(24) Research on Nepal’s digital electioneering describes RSP as a prime example of how strong social media strategy, data‑driven targeting, and influencer engagement can be decisive for new parties. (12)(21)

4.2 Components of the RSP digital strategy

Researchers and party insiders outline three core pillars of RSP’s social media strategy: mapping existing followers, deploying platform‑specific tools, and leveraging influencers. (12)(17)(21)

  • Audience mapping: The party first identified who was already following its leaders and pages, particularly urban youth and diaspora communities, and tailored content to strengthen this core base. (17)(21)
  • Platform prioritization: RSP prioritized Facebook for broad reach and TikTok for short‑form, high‑engagement content, while largely deprioritizing Twitter/X where sentiment was more mixed or hostile. (12)(21)
  • Influencer and volunteer networks: The party cultivated networks of content creators and micro‑influencers who produced memes, explainer videos, and live commentary amplifying speeches and campaign events, often on a volunteer or low‑cost basis. (17)(21)(22)

In the 2026 campaign, reports indicate that Shah delivered major speeches about every eight days, allowing a 600‑plus member social media team to edit, caption, and disseminate them across platforms in waves, synchronized with road shows and provincial visits. (8)(17) This cadence created repeated “viral peaks” rather than one‑off spikes, keeping RSP’s narrative dominant in online political discourse during the campaign period. (8)(12)(17)

4.3 Paid advertising, micro‑targeting, and risks

Media monitoring shows that parties, including smaller entrants, significantly increased spending on Meta platforms (Facebook, Instagram, etc.) ahead of the 2026 election, using sponsored posts targeted by constituency, age, gender, and interests. (23) Pages linked to RSP or promoting its candidates used sponsored content to reinforce organic reach, particularly in competitive urban constituencies. (21)(22)(23) While such spending was relatively modest in nominal terms, experts warn that precise micro‑targeting and weak disclosure requirements can create accountability gaps, amplify misinformation, and enable circumvention of campaign finance ceilings. (6)(12)(23)

5. Organization Building: From Networked Movement to Party

5.1 Central structures, mergers, and leadership expansion

RSP has moved from an initially loose network around Lamichhane into a more formal multi‑tier party structure. (24) It established and later expanded its central committee, which grew to around 40 members soon after the 2022 election and has since been further enlarged to integrate allies and new leaders. (16)(24)

Table 2: “Old politics” vs RSP on organization and finance

DimensionLegacy parties todayRSP today (as per article)Prospect / to‑do for RSP
Organization depthStrong local networks, cadres, and student wingsRapidly expanding, still thin beyond urban centersInvest in local committees, training, and issue cells
Internal democracyFormal but often leader-drivenEmerging structures, centralization risksClear statutes, internal elections, checks
Campaign financeUnder-reported, weak disclosure, reliance on big donorsSimilar under-reporting; small digital donations addedVoluntary over-compliance, real-time transparency
Digital presenceGrowing but unevenCore strength: 600+ social‑media team, influencer useIntegrate with an offline organization

The party has created additional vice‑chair positions, multiple general and deputy general secretaries, and deputy spokespersons, partly to accommodate mergers with figures associated with Bibeksheel Sajha and Balendra Shah. (16)(18) These moves indicate a transition from personality‑centric mobilization toward a more conventional party organization, though the rapid accretion of elites risks internal incoherence if not matched by programmatic consolidation. (16)(18)(24)

5.2 Sub-national organization and electoral committees

Central committee decisions have included plans to expand organizational structures across all provinces through extended meetings and to form candidate selection and party integration subcommittees. (24) A subcommittee led by vice‑chair Swarnim Wagle was tasked with recommending first‑past‑the‑post candidates, signaling attempts to institutionalize selection criteria beyond ad hoc personal decisions. (16) However, journalists and analysts have pointed out that RSP still blurs the line between party and parliamentary roles, for example, by nominating most lawmakers to the central committee, which may complicate internal checks and balances and long‑term cadre development. (15)(24)

5.3 Organization versus digital reach

Even RSP leaders acknowledge that robust organization remains the cornerstone of durable political influence and that social media simplifies but does not replace tasks such as candidate vetting, dispute resolution, and constituency service. (10)(15) The party’s heavy reliance on digital mobilization means it must rapidly invest in local committees, training, and issue‑based verticals if it is to govern effectively beyond core urban strongholds. (10)(22) Without this, there is a risk that expectations raised by its electoral success will outpace its capacity to implement policy at the federal, provincial, and local levels. (4)(10)(11)

6. Federalism and Parliamentary Reform Agenda

6.1 RSP’s core proposals

RSP’s manifesto, building on proposals first articulated in 2022, advocates for significant restructuring of Nepal’s federal‑parliamentary system. (2)(3)(25) Key elements include:

  • A directly elected executive prime minister at the federal level and directly elected chief ministers in provinces. (2)(3)(25)
  • A fully proportional representation (PR) parliament to ensure fairer representation, with MPs barred from simultaneously serving as ministers to strengthen the separation of powers. (2)(3)
  • Constitutional and legal provisions for recall elections, the right to reject candidates, and absentee voting. (1)(2)(3)
  • Non‑partisan local governments and a restructured provincial system, with proposals in earlier documents to dissolve provincial assemblies in favor of provincial councils elected by local heads. (2)(3)

Table 3: RSP’s constitutional proposals: design and implications

ProposalStatus quo (2015 Constitution)RSP proposalKey implications/risks
Executive selectionPM elected by HoR majorityDirectly elected executive PMStrong personal mandate vs risk of gridlock with PR HoR
Provincial executivesChief ministers elected by provincial assembliesDirectly elected chief ministersStronger provinces but more dual legitimacy conflicts
Electoral systemMixed: FPTP + PRFully PR parliamentFairer vote–seat match; more party fragmentation
MP–minister dual roleMPs can be ministersMPs barred from being ministersClearer separation, but less direct parliamentary control
Local governmentParty-based local electionsNon-partisan local governmentsDe-politicization vs risk of informal, personalized power
Voter toolsNo recall/NOTA/absentee (limited exceptions)Recall, NOTA, expanded absentee votingGreater accountability; more complex electoral management

The party frames these reforms as necessary to curb corruption, reduce political instability, and create stronger vertical accountability between voters and executives. (2)(25)

6.2 Political and constitutional feasibility

Implementing such reforms requires constitutional amendments needing a two‑thirds majority in the federal parliament plus ratification by at least half of the provincial assemblies, which no single party, including RSP, currently commands. (3)(25)(26) Proposals like directly elected executives and fully PR parliaments also have profound implications for the party system: they could marginalize smaller regional and identity‑based parties in executive contests while over‑representing them legislatively, potentially creating new gridlocks. (3)(25) Non‑partisan local governments and weakened provincial legislatures could dilute the gains achieved by historically marginalized groups through federal restructuring, raising resistance from Madhesh‑based and identity‑federalist forces. (24)(26)

6.3 Effects on federal practice and center–province relations

If implemented as articulated, RSP’s model would centralize executive authority while maintaining multi‑level structures, thereby altering incentives for coalition‑building, inter‑governmental bargaining, and party organization. (2)(3)(25) Directly elected executives at federal and provincial levels could strengthen decisiveness but also generate dual mandates that clash with coalition norms in a fragmented legislature. (3)(25) Fully PR legislatures could become more fragmented and less geographically anchored, making it harder to form stable governments without strong party discipline or pre‑electoral alliances. Non‑partisan local governments could, in principle, depoliticize service delivery but risk re‑personalizing and informalizing local power in the absence of party accountability mechanisms. (15)(25)

7. Analyzing RSP’s Manifesto Promises

7.1 Governance and anti‑corruption agenda

RSP’s Citizen Contract emphasizes a high-profile “anti-corruption mega campaign”, including a commission to investigate assets acquired since 1990, universal digital delivery of services, and depoliticization of bureaucracy and constitutional bodies. (1)(2) Legally, establishing a powerful investigative commission with retroactive reach over multiple decades will require careful constitutional and statutory design to avoid violating principles of non-retroactivity, due process, and separation of powers. (1)(2)(3) Existing institutions- the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, National Vigilance Centre, and Auditor General- would need either significant reform or a clear division of labor to prevent institutional conflict. (1)(3)(4) Politically, targeting wealth accumulated by cross-party elites since 1990 will encounter strong resistance, meaning these pledges are unlikely to be fully realized without broad multi-party compacts and credible guarantees against selective prosecution. (1)(2)(15)

7.2 Economic targets and fiscal realism

RSP’s macroeconomic targets- 7 percent annual growth, per capita income above USD 3,000, and a USD 100 billion economy within 5- 7 years- assume a substantial acceleration relative to recent performance and require rapid increases in investment, productivity, and export capacity. (1)(2)

Table 4. Economic context vs RSP targets

Indicator / targetRecent reality (approximate)RSP ambition (manifesto)Gap / challenge
GDP growth~4–5% average in recent years7% annual over 5 yearsRequires major jump in investment and productivity
GDP sizeAround USD 40–45 billion~USD 100 billion in 5–7 yearsMore than doubling in a decade
Per‑Capita Income~USD 1,400–1,500>USD 3,000 in 5–7 yearsNeeds sustained high growth and low population growth
Installed power capacityBelow 5,000 MW (with rapid recent growth)30,000 MW in 10 yearsHuge scaling in projects, transmission, PPAs, diplomacy
Remittances as % of GDP~27% of GDP, ~USD 14+ billion a yearNot to reduce, but to “transform into investment”Remittance‑consumption trap, low productive use
Trade deficit (goods)~Rs 987 billion; exports ≈ 13.8% of importsNarrow deficit via exports, especially electricityRequires export diversification and regional energy deals
FDIUSD 57m in 2024 (~0.17% of GDP), down ~70% in 6 yearsSignificant FDI for energy, tourism, ICTInvestor confidence, regulatory and political risk
Climate impact on GDPProjected loss of ≈2.2% of annual GDP by 2050 without adaptationNo quantified target, but big infrastructure pushMust climate‑proof investments to avoid net losses

Achieving these while also expanding social protection, healthcare, education, and infrastructure as promised would necessitate:

  • Major tax reform to broaden the base, reduce evasion, and rebalance the burden without undermining investment incentives.
  • Reprioritization of expenditure, including rationalizing subsidies and leakages in existing programs to free fiscal space.
  • Large‑scale private and foreign investment in sectors such as hydropower, tourism, and IT, for which RSP promises regulatory simplification and a single‑window system. (19)

The pledge to achieve 30,000 MW of installed electricity capacity within a decade illustrates the scale of ambition: it would require sustained annual capacity additions several times higher than historical averages, streamlined land and environmental clearance processes, and credible long‑term power purchase agreements and cross‑border transmission planning. (2) Without detailed financing plans, risk‑sharing mechanisms, and regional diplomacy, such targets risk remaining aspirational.

7.3 Social policy and universalist commitments

RSP’s programme envisions universal or near‑universal access to quality healthcare, education, and integrated social security, with cradle‑to‑grave protection through unified social protection systems. (1)(3) For healthcare, commitments align with earlier positions advocating a single‑payer system and extensive investment in district and local health facilities. Implementing such schemes would require:

  • Substantial increases in public health and education expenditure as a share of GDP, with commensurate improvements in procurement, human resources, and governance to avoid waste. (2)(3)
  • Overhaul of fragmented social protection programs into integrated registries and benefit systems, which implies significant administrative reforms and investments in digital infrastructure and data protection. (1)(2)
  • Political agreements on targeting versus universalism to ensure fiscal sustainability and equity.

7.4 Constitutional and institutional reforms

Constitutional reforms around direct elections, PR parliaments, judicial appointments and abolition of the Constitutional Council will demand not just super‑majority votes but also careful design to safeguard checks and balances. (2)(3)(25) RSP’s proposals to replace political appointments in constitutional bodies with merit‑based selections recommended by the National Assembly and confirmed by the House of Representatives could strengthen professionalism, but will only be credible if selection criteria, transparency, and minority protections are codified and enforced. (2)(3) Similarly, judicial reform promises to end “sharing‑based” appointments and introduce competitive recruitment processes, but these must be insulated from new forms of politicization or capture by dominant groups within the legal profession. (2)(3)(25)

8. Structural Economic Vulnerabilities: Remittance Trap and Trade Deficit

8.1 Remittance-driven growth and its limits

Remittances account for roughly 25- 29 percent of Nepal’s GDP, among the highest ratios globally; World Bank estimates indicate remittances at about 26.9 percent of GDP in 2023 and over USD 14 billion in 2024. (27) Monthly inflows crossed Rs 200 billion for the first time in late 2025, and by mid‑FY 2025/26, remittances had reached around Rs 1,062.93 billion, a nearly 39 percent year-on-year increase. (29) Around 1.7 million Nepalis work in West Asia, and Gulf States plus Malaysia account for a large share of total remittances, as highlighted in migration and central‑bank analyses. (30)

Table 5. Structural vulnerabilities: snapshot

Structural issueCurrent pattern/ figureWhy it matters for RSP’s agenda
Remittance dependence25–29% of GDP; 92% consumed, ~8% saved/investedLimits domestic investment: fuels import-heavy growth
Trade with India~80% of exports; large bilateral deficit despite rising power exportsThe hydropower export strategy must be embedded in a wider trade policy
Trade with ChinaImports ≈ Rs 299 bn vs tiny exports; deficit ≈ Rs 338 bnHighlights vulnerability, need for export diversification
FDI trendFrom USD 185m (2019) to USD 57m (2024)Weakens financing for big infrastructure promises
Climate/ disaster riskPotential 2.2% GDP loss by 2050; >80% population is exposed to the hazardUndermines growth; demands resilient design of RSP projects
Youth politics~1m new first-time voters (2026); millions of Gen‑Z eligibleRSP’s base demands quick, visible delivery and inclusion

Studies describe Nepal as stuck in a “remittance trap”: approximately 92 percent of remittances are consumed, with only about 8 percent saved or invested in productive assets, while high remittance inflows contribute to import-heavy consumption and discourage export-oriented production. (31) Despite substantial liquidity and comfortable foreign‑exchange reserves, private investment remains low, and growth has averaged about 4- 5 percent in recent years, highlighting structural weaknesses in the investment climate. (27)(31)

8.2 Trade deficit with India and regional dependence

Nepal runs a persistent and large trade deficit, particularly with India. In FY 2024/25, the trade deficit stood at about Rs 987.39 billion, with exports covering only around 13.8 percent of imports. (32) India remains Nepal’s largest trading partner, accounting for roughly 79- 80 percent of exports and a majority of imports, including all petroleum products. In the same period, exports to India- especially electricity and some agro-manufactured goods- increased by about 82.5 percent year‑on‑year, yet the absolute bilateral deficit remains high.

China, meanwhile, has reemerged as a significant economic actor: Chinese exports to Nepal reached nearly Rs 298.77 billion in 2023/24, while Nepal’s exports to China remain tiny, yielding a bilateral trade deficit of roughly Rs 338.47 billion in 2024/25. (33) These imbalances highlight Nepal’s import dependence and limited export diversification.

8.3 Relevance to RSP’s agenda

RSP’s targets of rapid growth, a USD 100 billion economy, and universalistic welfare are difficult to achieve unless policies actively transform the remittance‑consumption model and reduce structural trade imbalances, especially with India. This implies:

  • Designing migration policy as a development strategy- focusing on skills, savings, and return migration- rather than merely a coping mechanism.
  • Creating financial instruments (diaspora bonds, remittance-linked SME credit lines) to channel a portion of remittances into productive sectors aligned with RSP’s priorities (energy, agro‑processing, tourism, ICT).
  • Embedding hydropower expansion and energy exports into a coherent regional trade strategy with India (and Bangladesh via Indian transit), using electricity exports to partly offset fuel imports and the trade deficit.

9. Climate and Environmental Vulnerabilities

9.1 High climate risk and economic impact

Nepal is highly vulnerable to climate change and natural disasters. Analyses drawing on Asian Development Bank work suggest Nepal could lose up to about 2.2 percent of its annual GDP by 2050 as a result of climate change. (34) Global indices and national assessments show that Nepal suffers frequent climate-related disasters- floods, landslides, storms, droughts- with thousands of deaths and large economic losses over recent decades. (34)(35)

More than 80 percent of the population is exposed to at least one climate‑induced hazard, exacerbated by fragile terrain, unplanned settlements, and weak infrastructure. (35) These vulnerabilities intersect directly with RSP’s big‑infrastructure and hydropower agenda.

9.2 Integrating resilience into RSP’s programme

RSP’s manifesto highlights infrastructure, hydropower, and urban transformation, but is more muted on how climate risks will be managed systematically. To be credible and sustainable, RSP’s programme must:

  • Mainstream climate‑risk screening and resilient design into all public investments, especially dams, roads, urban expansion, and energy systems.
  • Use federalism to decentralize adaptation- clarifying responsibilities and financing channels for provinces and municipalities in disaster risk reduction, watershed management, climate‑resilient agriculture, and housing.
  • Ring‑fence a share of hydropower or carbon‑finance revenues for local adaptation funds managed transparently at provincial and local levels.

10. Partnerships with the Private Sector and Civil Society

10.1 Public–private partnerships (PPPs) and private investment

FDI in Nepal remains low and has declined sharply: UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2025, as summarized by the Kathmandu Post, shows net inflows falling from about USD 185 million in 2019 to USD 57 million in 2024- a drop of roughly 69- 70 percent- bringing FDI down to around 0.17 percent of GDP. (36) To close the large infrastructure and services gap, Nepal’s PPP Policy (2015) and PPP Act (2019) promote collaboration with the private sector, particularly in energy, transport, tourism, and urban services. (36) Experts argue Nepal must raise infrastructure investment to around 8- 10 percent of GDP- up from roughly 4 percent- if it wants to reach middle-income and SDG goals. (36)

RSP’s manifesto aligns with this need by proposing a one-window system, streamlined approvals, and a bigger role for private capital in infrastructure and energy.

10.2 Role of NGOs and civil society

Civil society organizations (CSOs) and NGOs play a central role in Nepal’s development ecosystem, particularly in SDG localization, rights-based work, climate action, and monitoring of state commitments. The 2024 civil‑society VNR report emphasizes that achieving the SDGs requires multi-stakeholder partnerships that include CSOs as co-designers and monitors, not just implementers. (37) Civil‑society platforms underline the importance of inclusive dialogue in shaping national positions amid global crises.

10.3 Shared responsibilities for RSP

For RSP, this means:

  • Using PPPs as a core implementation tool while also strengthening legal frameworks for risk‑sharing, transparency, and dispute resolution, and ensuring parliamentary and civil‑society oversight.
  • Treating CSOs as partners in co-designing reforms in social protection, climate resilience, inclusion, and federalism, including through institutionalized multi-stakeholder platforms at federal and provincial levels.
  • Encouraging self-regulation and accountability in both private and NGO sectors alongside state reforms, so that governance improvements are systemic rather than one-sided.

11. Geo-strategy: Between India and China

11.1 Trade and connectivity realities

India is Nepal’s dominant trading partner, accounting for around 79- 80 percent of exports and a large share of imports, including all petroleum products. While exports to India have grown sharply in some years- driven by electricity, agriculture, and manufactured goods- the bilateral deficit remains substantial. China, post-pandemic, has renewed its economic foothold: bilateral trade has rebounded, Chinese exports to Nepal reached nearly Rs 298.77 billion in 2023/24, and Nepal’s trade deficit with China was about Rs 338.47 billion in 2024/25. (33) Investment interest and infrastructure cooperation under various frameworks are back on the agenda.

11.2 Leveraging strategic position for RSP’s agenda

Situated between two major economies, Nepal has the potential to function as an energy, tourism, and logistics corridor if it avoids being drawn into zero-sum geopolitics. For RSP, this implies:

  • Anchoring its hydropower expansion in transparent, Parliament‑scrutinized power‑trade agreements with India (and Bangladesh via Indian transit), turning electricity exports into a reliable source of foreign exchange and fiscal revenue.
  • Carefully structuring Chinese investment in infrastructure, tourism, and manufacturing to maximize technology transfer and job creation while protecting debt sustainability, environmental standards, and strategic autonomy.
  • Using multi‑alignment- strong economic ties with both neighbors, clear red lines on security and sovereignty- to pursue shared prosperity rather than geopolitical point‑scoring.

12. Global Shocks: Iran- US/Israel War and Its Implications

12.1 Exposure through remittances and oil

The 2026 Iran- US/Israel conflict has raised war‑risk premiums for shipping in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to push global oil prices well above USD 100 per barrel if disruptions continue, according to contemporary energy‑market commentary. (38) Analysts warn of heightened volatility in global energy markets, potentially triggering inflationary pressures and recession risks.

Nepal is acutely exposed through two channels:

  • Remittances: Roughly 80 percent of labor migrants are in the Middle East and Malaysia, and remittances- heavily from Gulf States- constitute over a quarter of GDP. Any sustained shock to Gulf economies or labor demand would hit household incomes, banking liquidity, and external stability. (27)(31)(38)
  • Oil imports: Nepal imports all its petroleum from India, which in turn procures much of its crude from the Gulf; petroleum products account for about a quarter of Nepal’s import bill. Price spikes directly translate into higher trade deficits, inflation, and fiscal pressures. (32)(38)

12.2 Scope for RSP’s response

In this context, RSP’s transformative agenda requires a risk-informed, cooperative approach:

  • Labor‑migration diplomacy: Work with other parties to formulate a long-term strategy with Gulf States on labor rights, crisis response, and remittance security, ensuring that migrant workers and their families are protected during shocks.
  • Accelerated green transition: Use oil‑price volatility to justify faster investment in domestic renewables (hydro, solar) and electrification of transport and industry, via PPPs and remittance-backed instruments.
  • Shock-responsive social protection: Collaborate with CSOs, local governments, and the private sector to build social‑protection systems that can respond quickly to remittance or price shocks, particularly for remittance-dependent and poor households.

13. What Is Needed to Realize RSP’s Agenda

13.1 Political requirements

To materialize core elements of its manifesto, RSP must prioritize broad coalition‑building rather than majoritarian confrontation. (2)(25) Constitutional amendments on executive design, electoral systems, and provincial structures cannot pass without cooperation from legacy parties and key regional forces, making inclusive dialogue and transparent “discussion papers” essential. (26) Building trust with Madheshi, Janajati, Dalit, women’s, and other historically marginalized constituencies is critical to avoid perceptions that reforms amount to recentralization or rollback of inclusion gains. (24)(26) Internally, the party will need clear rules that separate government and party roles, institutionalize internal democracy, and prevent over‑centralization in its leadership.

13.2 Financial and administrative requirements

Financing the manifesto requires credible medium‑term fiscal frameworks, independent revenue projections, and explicit sequencing of big‑ticket items (energy, health, education, social protection) to avoid over‑commitment. This implies:

  • Strengthening the National Planning Commission and Ministry of Finance capacities for integrated planning that align with RSP’s targets, including public‑investment management reforms. (1)(2)
  • Overhauling party and campaign finance laws to mandate real‑time disclosure of donations and expenditures and empower the Election Commission to enforce ceilings and sanction violations- including by RSP itself. (6)
  • Investing in civil service reform, including performance management systems, e‑governance platforms, and merit‑based recruitment and promotion, so that ambitious programs can be implemented without being captured by existing patronage networks. (1)(2)(4)

13.3 Constitutional and legal steps

On the constitutional front, RSP must sequence reforms to avoid systemic shock. Initial, more achievable steps include legal amendments to expand absentee voting, pilot recall mechanisms in limited jurisdictions, and incrementally depoliticize appointments to constitutional bodies. (2)(3)(25) Larger questions- directly elected executives, fully PR parliament, non‑partisan local governments and provincial restructuring- should follow extensive expert consultation, impact assessments and, ideally, multi‑party referendum‑backed settlements. (2)(3)(25)(26) Judicial reforms will require amendments to laws governing the Judicial Council, case management, and disciplinary procedures, with safeguards for independence and minority representation. (2)(3)(25)

14. Way forward: transformative change without revenge politics

14.1 Governing ethos: From anti‑establishment to system reformer

RSP’s continued legitimacy depends on shifting from an anti‑establishment posture to a system‑reforming, consensus‑building role. This requires avoiding personalized vendettas against leaders of other parties while robustly pursuing institutional reforms- on party finance, public appointments, procurement, and service delivery- that reduce the scope for corruption and abuse across the board. The party can signal this shift by supporting impartial investigations into corruption, accepting scrutiny of its own leaders, and resisting selective prosecutions that appear targeted at weakening specific parties.

14.2 Inclusive coalition‑building and confidence‑building measures

To avoid recentralization anxieties and identity backlash, RSP must embed its federal and constitutional proposals in inclusive political processes. This means systematic engagement with organizations representing Madheshi, Janajati, Dalit, Muslim, women, LGBTQI+, and person with disability (PwD) constituencies when debating executive design, electoral systems, and provincial restructuring, and treating these as political questions rather than purely technocratic ones.  Protecting- and where appropriate strengthening- guarantees on proportional representation, affirmative action, and language and identity rights is essential if structural reforms are not to be perceived as rolling back the gains of the federal transition.  RSP should build programmatic alliances- on issues like cooperative reform, youth employment, education quality, and urban governance- that cut across party lines, demonstrating that transformative change can be collaborative rather than winner‑takes‑all.

14.3 Deepening organizational democracy and accountability

Internally, RSP has an opportunity to model a different political culture. This entails transparent and rules-based candidate selection, time-bound internal elections for key positions, mandatory and regularly updated asset and interest disclosures for leaders, and participatory policy‑formulation processes that extend beyond Kathmandu-based elites. On finance, RSP should move from minimum legal compliance to voluntary over-compliance: publishing real-time donation and expenditure data, disclosing donors above low thresholds, commissioning independent audits, and supporting stronger enforcement powers for the Election Commission. Combined with open‑data tools on government performance- such as public dashboards on the Citizen Contract targets- these steps would tangibly distinguish RSP from the opaque practices it criticizes.

14.4 Sequencing reforms to match capacity and risk

Given limited state capacity and fragile coalitions, RSP should sequence reforms to deliver early wins while building support for deeper structural change. A first phase could prioritize high-impact, lower‑conflict measures: digitalization of frontline services, tighter procurement rules, cooperative‑sector clean-up, and pilots of performance-based budgeting and civil‑service management. In parallel, the party can begin negotiated, evidence-based discussions on constitutional changes, federal restructuring, and electoral reform, backed by green papers, independent assessments, and, where feasible, referenda.

14.5 Embedding structural risks into RSP’s reform strategy

Finally, RSP’s transformative agenda must be anchored in a sober appreciation of Nepal’s structural vulnerabilities. This includes designing a migration policy to maximize skills and savings rather than reinforcing the remittance‑consumption trap; using regional energy trade and export diversification to narrow trade deficits; and mainstreaming climate resilience into all infrastructure and hydropower plans. It also requires a proactive stance on global shocks- such as Middle East conflicts- through labor‑migration diplomacy, accelerated renewable‑energy investment, and shock-responsive social protection for remittance-dependent households. By combining institutional reforms at home with cooperative strategies abroad, RSP can pursue transformative change without revenge politics and with broader societal confidence.

Ultimately, the victory of one party does not imply that others must be pushed to the sidelines. Every voice, irrespective of its position inside or outside the federal parliament, deserves to be heard and partnered with. This victory should be interpreted not as a singular triumph, but as a shared responsibility of all- to build a fair, inclusive, and just Nepal.

A revised, synthesized, and public-facing version of the article in Nepali language is available at Onlinekhabar, March 12, 2026.

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